Monthly Archives: March 2022
Italy: Stop The NATO War Machine – Seaport workers have called for a strike against arms shipments – 25 March 2022
In preparation for the general workers’ mobilization on April 22nd in Rome, the National Coordination of Port Workers USB launches a day of struggle on March 31 in Genoa.
The price of the conflict will be paid by the workers through layoffs and a high cost of living. Not a penny, a rifle, or a soldier for war. We block our ports for arms trafficking. It is time for the worker variant.
As port workers, they have no intention of remaining indifferent to the new winds of war that are blowing back into Europe.
This conflict, which has a genesis that goes far beyond the convenient reconstruction of our national media and our politicians, like any war in history, will have serious consequences for all of us. The workers will pay the costs. In Ukraine and Russia, of course, but also in European countries, through the increase in the cost of energy goods such as gas and oil, and military spending. All this will have devastating repercussions for our country. Mass layoffs and restructurings, which have never stopped, will continue unabated. Millions of workers, already in difficulty following the pandemic crisis, will find themselves with closed companies and lower wages. With the increase in the cost of living and no overall wage adjustment starting from the minimum tables, purchasing power will be drastically reduced. The price of gasoline, which has reached record figures (€2.50 per liter) and shows no signs of stopping, will also affect the mobility of workers and the cost of final products, starting with food.
All this while our government, a useful servant of NATO and American interests, tries to drag us even further into the conflict by sending economic resources and adopting sanctions. Policies that only fuel conflict. Because it is our conviction that the war economy and the arms trafficking that this determines are one of the main causes of conflicts and their explosion when the ruling classes feed them, operating in clear disregard of the national laws according to which Italy repudiates war and refrains from any supply and military support to the warring parties.
What should be a staple of our country’s political and civil life has been relegated to the attic for decades in deference to industrial and geopolitical interests unrelated to workers.
The themes of war and work are closely linked. Keeping them separate would be a mistake, especially for us port workers who work closely with goods and do not want to be complicit in the war by moving armaments of any type and any destination through our ports.
For these reasons, the national coordination of USB ports has decided to launch a day of mobilization in Genoa on the occasion of the arrival in port of the Saudi ship Bahri, loaded with US weapons.
In recent weeks, our workers have carried out monitoring work in the airports where we are present, denouncing any movement of arms, from Genoa to Livorno, passing through Trieste and Civitavecchia. At the Pisa airport, USB workers have already refused to load weapons on a civilian plane that, on paper, was supposed to carry humanitarian aid.
We have decided to converge on Genoa on March 31, also promoting a national assembly of workers involved in these fronts. An important moment of struggle and confrontation that will also serve to confirm our adhesion to the mobilization of April 22nd in Rome, when the workers of industry, commerce, logistics, transport, and ports will go on strike and will demonstrate directly in front of the buildings of power their anger and their determination.
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Faces – 11:16am – 21 March 2022
Au début, ce n’est presque rien…
Au début, ce n’est presque rien, le crissement des pneus sur le gravier, un bruit de moteur qui s’éloigne, et il vous faut un peu de temps encore pour vous rendre compte qu’il ne reste plus que vous dans la maison.
10 Classic Books That Should Be Banned
Little Women – A classic story that would be banned for implying women are little, or that they exist in any way. Should be called Standardized Menstruating Persons.
Moby Dick – A man’s obsession with a whale is depicted as a negative. Pfft! You do you, Captain Ahab! It’s almost as offensive as Queequeg not coming out of the closet. His name is so close to “queer” but they never outright say it. Sad.
Human Reproductive Biology, 4th Edition – Can you believe it took four editions and they still didn’t filter out the hate?
A Little Princess – A similar problem to Little Women, only now it perpetuates white privilege. Disgusting!
Nancy Drew and the Case of the Missing Laptop – Maybe in a year when the New York Times makes sure the coast is clear.
The Berenstain Bears: He Bear, She Bear – I shouldn’t even have to explain this one. Take your oppressive gender binary somewhere else, Berenstain Bears!
How To Avoid Huge Ships – Fatphobic against majestic huge ships.
Identifying Wood – Wood must self-identify. You cannot assume.
War and Peace – Written by a RUSSIAN. Leo Tolstoy has not yet condemned the actions of Vladimir Putin.
The Tuttle Twins – Where to begin? These anti-socialism, pro-traditional values books shouldn’t be allowed anywhere.
Russian National Anthem – Bolshoi Junior Choir
The Sacred War
Der Heilige Krieg
I Know What Boys Like – by Shampoo
Pakistan: International Women’s Day – 8 March 2022
About 2,000 women have rallied in the Pakistani city of Lahore despite efforts by authorities to bar the protest and withdraw security for an event frequently the target of violence.
Rallies on International Women’s Day have received fierce backlash since they were embraced four years ago in deeply conservative and patriarchal Pakistan.
In a society where women have been shot, stabbed, stoned, set alight and strangled for damaging family “honour”, critics accuse rights activists of promoting liberal Western values and disrespecting religious and cultural mores.
On Tuesday, dozens of events marking International Women’s Day – known as the Aurat March in Pakistan – were held across the country.
Non-violent counterprotests, dubbed “hijab marches”, were also staged by women from conservative religious groups in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad where participants called for the preservation of Islamic values.
In the eastern city of Lahore, city authorities urged organisers to cancel the rally over safety concerns, threatening security would not be provided.
However, following a legal challenge, the Lahore High Court ruled the event could go ahead and authorities agreed to provide protection.
The women marched through the streets in a jovial atmosphere, chanting slogans such as “Give respect to women” and “End the patriarchy”.
They were guarded by riot police – and greeted by a small band of men chanting “end this obscenity”.
Student Sairah Khan, 23, cited recent high-profile cases of brutal violence against women “without consequences” for her attendance.
In Karachi – Pakistan’s largest city – about 1,000 women gathered in a festive atmosphere, with organisers conducting security checks as police stood by idly.
“We have only one slogan: ‘Equal wages, protection and peace’,” one woman chanted from a stage.
In the capital city of Islamabad, about 200 women rallied outside the city’s press club.
“We have come to raise our voices and highlight our issues,” said student Fatima Shahzad.
They were outmatched by more than 400 counter-protesters from conservative religious parties.
But organiser Farzana Bari pledged, “We will continue to assert ourselves.”
“These are the women who refused to bow down,” she told the AFP news agency.
In 2020, groups of men turned up in vans and hurled stones at women as they marched through Islamabad.
Doctored videos and photos of last year’s events were spread online that even appeared on popular television shows, falsely accusing women of chanting or carrying blasphemous slogans – an act which carries the death penalty in Pakistan.
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“Fuck it!” Russia’s Final Break With the West – by Niccolo Soldo – 23 Feb 2022
US-Russian joint tactical victory, European and Ukrainian defeat
Celebrations have been taking place in the self-declared Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in what is almost universally recognized Ukraine. Having declared independence eight years ago, events have now forced Russia’s hand in which these two nascent entities are now recognized by Moscow, with all the protections that come with it. One cannot help but understand why these people are celebrating.
Another celebration is taking place in the USA. The State Department has achieved its main objective of seeing Nordstream 2 put on ice. American LNG producers are now popping champagne bottles as they can envision huge stacks of cash to be made by overcharging Europeans desperate for gas. The Military-Industrial Complex is chuffed as well, as the arms will continue to pour into Ukraine and into the NATO armies in its periphery.
How did we get here?
Despite assurances to the contrary, NATO is not a ‘defensive organization’. Even though American memories are short, people elsewhere remember the bombing campaign against Serbia, and the removal of Gaddafi from power in Libya. What NATO is in fact is the military arm of US hegemony, a hegemony that has seen it expand eastwards through Europe, right up to Russia’s very own borders.
“Don’t individual states reserve the right to enter into alliances with those they see fit, Niccolo?” Of course they do. But not all countries are islands, and most countries have neighbours. And not all neighbouring states are created equal, and they have their own national security concerns and interests. This is the case with Russia.
Russia has been invaded several times from the west since Napoleon first crossed the border to enter Imperial Russian soil in 1812. Every time since, western powers have been forced out, but have left behind devastation in their wake. This explains why Russia has sought buffers to its west ever since, with the largest buffer being its puppet regimes in eastern and central Europe during the Cold War.
NATO, originally set up to counter the USSR’s expansion into Europe, was left without a raison d’etre after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR. Nevertheless, it pressed on eastwards, and thanks to the CIA and MI6, effected Colour Revolutions to put into power friendly regimes that sought NATO membership in places like Tbilisi and Kiev. Where Colour Revolutions weren’t necessary due to historical grievances against Russia, NATO missile systems pointed at Russia have been set up (Romania and Poland).
For Russia, the nightmare scenario of dismemberment from the west is now tangible. You may disagree with their perspective, but what is important is HOW they view the situation. If you can’t understand their views, it is therefore impossible to talk to them, unless you are only willing to lecture to them or threaten them.
And lectures on democracy and threats to their economy and existence are all that have come out of the west towards Russia recently.
Ukraine’s Geostrategic Importance
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, wrote in his vital work “The Grand Chessboard” that without Ukraine, Russia goes from a Eurasian power to simply Asian, i.e. a world power demoted to that of a regional one. Since Boris Yeltsin left power, US foreign policy goals sought to detach Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence. Why?
Not just for the reason Brzezinski illustrated, but because of a concept known as ‘nuclear primacy’. Nuclear primacy is the condition in which a nuclear power can defeat another nuclear power by eliminating its nuclear weapons before they can be launched against them. The reason why NATO ABM sites have been built in Poland and Romania is to push their reach closer to Russia’s European borders, the part where most Russian citizens live. This already increases the threat to Russia immensely, and has informed their military tech research and manufacturing to focus on anti-missile defence and away from conventional threats.
By capturing Ukraine and incorporating it into NATO, Ukraine could then potentially serve as a much, much closer missile launching site for NATO missiles pointed at Russia. The Ukrainian border is less than 500km from Moscow, for example. Can you blame the Russians for freaking out? I certainly can’t.
For Russia, Ukraine is an existential matter. For the USA, it is only an asset that can be easily sacrificed for the greater objective of surrounding and neutralizing Russia so as to achieve nuclear primacy and ensure is own hegemony.
You Should Be Nice to Your Neighbours, Especially When They Are Much More Powerful Than You Are
Ukraine has the right to rule over its territory as it sees fit. This is called sovereignty. Ukraine also has the right to seek alliances to maintain that sovereignty and to protect its own perceived interests.
Theory is great, but it is only theory. Reality does tend to intrude though. In this case, the Ukrainians have made a mess out of their post-Maidan revolution by exacerbating Moscow’s natural paranoia through its constant requests to join NATO. By doing this, Ukraine antagonizes its much more powerful neighbour which sees itself under existential threat from its smaller neighbour’s invitations to host a hostile organization on its soil. It is therefore only natural that Russia would act to neutralize this existential threat, because it can and it showed in 2014 (and again this week) that it will.
Much like how the USA would never tolerate a Chinese client regime in Mexico with nukes pointed at it, the Russians have shown that they won’t tolerate NATO in Ukraine. For the past few months, head Russian diplomat Lavrov has patiently explained to the West that NATO in Ukraine is a non-starter for them, and that they will take actions to ensure that their national security interests are protected. These security interests come at the cost of Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea in 2014, and now over the Donbass as of yesterday.
What Are the Ukrainians Thinking?????
Everyone wishes to maximize their own autonomy, and Ukrainians aren’t that different in that respect. The calculation that Ukrainians have made in the past and continue to make going forward is that by tying themselves to the world’s superpower, the USA, they will protect their own state and sovereignty, even if they have to make some painful concessions to the Americans (such as economic and political reforms, and cultural reforms like gay pride parades in this very conservative country). Therefore, get away from Russia > being under the American thumb. The Ukrainians took one look at their neighbours in Poland, Lithuania, and Romania and saw that NATO membership protected them from unwanted Russian advances. They also saw that Georgia was partitioned in between the two para-states known as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with rump Georgia, a state that wasn’t under the NATO umbrella.
Ukraine’s calculation failed because it didn’t take into account three important points:
- historical-cultural ties between it and Russia
- Ukraine’s sheer size and geographic position
- the fact that the two points above make Ukraine, unlike the other states listed, an existential matter to Russia
There is a fourth point which completely tanks Ukraine’s position:
President Joe Biden has consistently and loudly stated that the American and NATO cavalries are not coming to Ukraine’s rescue if the Russians do invade. The USA, the prime mover in this crisis, is openly stating that it is willing to sacrifice Ukraine and Ukrainian lives for its own larger objectives.
Ukrainian President Shecky Greenberg is fucked beyond belief. I strongly doubt he is as passionate about Ukrainian independence as a Banderista from West Ukraine, but I don’t doubt that he does harbour some desire to see his country free from Russian control. The problem is that he has zero room for maneuver, caught between a Russia breathing down his neck, and a USA that has him by the balls as he is listed in corruption indexes as having overseas accounts with money thieved from his own country’s coffers, no doubt via his sponsor, Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoisky. He has to dance to the USA’s tune, or it’s all over him. Still, he deserves a little bit of respect since he has been actively pushing back against the US Goverment and media’s Peter Cries Wolf act.
Since the 2014 Maidan Revolution, Ukraine has seen the following happen to it:
- Crimea annexed by Russia
- Donbass now effectively Russian
- Russia stating that Donbass extends into presently-held Ukrainian territory
- Millions of Ukrainians fleeing/emigrating Ukraine
- Collapsed economy
- Economic and political reforms stalled
- Collapse in birth rate (happening everywhere, of course)
What has Ukraine gained since the Maidan revolution? This is a fair question to ask. Another fair question to ask is “how are you going to get your occupied territories back, since doing so means war with Russia?”
The most important question to ask Ukrainians is: “In light of all the things that you have lost and in light of the USA openly saying that they will not defend you, is ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ really worth it, considering that you might even lose more than you have already?
USA Triumphant
Ukraine is disposable in American eyes. That warmongering bitch Vicki “Fuck the EU” Nuland (she runs Russia policy in the US State Department) must be laughing her fat and disgusting ass off at how stupid the Ukrainians are to willingly sacrifice themselves for her project to surround, neutralize, and dismember Russia. All is going according to plan.
This crisis was not about Ukraine. Ukraine only provided the setting for which this crisis is playing itself out. The point of this crisis, from the US perspective, is to effect a final cut off of Russia from Europe economically, so as to reduce Russian influence and increase US dominance on the continent, while cashing in by way of LNG exports to replace Russian gas deliveries. That’s it. The USA is more than happy in seeing Kiev occupied by Russian forces, because it kills the NordStream 2 pipeline, and opens up new business for American LNG companies, as well as bigger business for US arms exporters.
The ideal situation to them is to see the Russians invade, overextend themselves, and fall into an Afghanistan-type quagmire, in which Ukraine is set ablaze, and Ukrainians, backed by massive arms deliveries from the USA, engage in a partizan/mujahidden guerrilla war with Russian forces to drain Russia and to embarrass it. Who cares how many Ukrainian cities are levelled, how many civilians die? It will all be pinned on Vladimir Putler anyway, at the Hague War Crimes Tribunal that they dream of in their sleep.
The USA already dominates Europe by way of NATO and trade agreements, its scheisskultur permeates much of the continent, whether through popular culture or though academic trends such as wokeness. Why not solidify that control by way of controlling its energy sector as well?
US media has made a fool out of itself, as have American talking heads…..but this is what they are there for. Without any accountability for their words and actions, they have every reason to continue lying to us as they have done now for decades in service to their foreign policy designs. Take a look at this one:
Laurence Tribe @tribelawPutin’s stated intention to round up, jail or even execute dissidents, LGBTQ and religious and ethnic minorities in Ukraine portends crimes against humanity. That nation’s 200,000 Jews are directly targeted. Sadly, economic sanctions are all we and our NATO allies have available.February 22nd 20224,117 Retweets11,573 Likes
Nordstream 2 represented a nightmare scenario for US policy planners: Russia and Germany engaging in cooperation outside of US monitoring. With Russia turning towards China, the apocalyptic vision of a China-Russia-Germany alliance begins to unfold in Washington, DC. Not allowed!
Europe: Led By Cowards
Poland, Finland, the Baltic States, Romania, and others all have their historical grievances towards Russia, which must be understood and accepted. Only time heals these deep wounds. Aside from that, Europe’s interests should be in tapping into Russia’s massive natural resources, and to trade with the USA, China, and others. Instead, Europe is once again paying the price for American foreign policy as the US does very little trade with Russia, while Europe does quite a lot!
The Americans are happy to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian, and to sanction Russia to the last European with five Euros in his pocket. It bears the brunt of sanctions against Russia just like it has with sanctions on Iran.
Much was made of Macron’s shuttle diplomacy these past few weeks, but the Russians saw right through his ‘good cop’ act, which ran in tandem with the US ‘bad cop’. They entertained his overtures due to diplomatic protocol, but that was it. Macron wasted his time and our time.
The Brits continue to yap like the American poodles that they are.
The Germans are the sad figures here. Putting Nordstream 2 on ice due to this crisis politicizes the pipeline, where Scholz’s predecessors insisted on it being independent of politics altogether. Even though it is ‘temporarily’ suspended, this politicization makes it now a white elephant. The Germans are going to have to figure out how to import power in light of decommissioning their nuclear reactors and swearing off of coal. Germany’s Greens are, of course, detached from reality, thinking that they can get renewables to fill in the coming gap:
Cutting itself off completely from Russian gas would leave a big hole in the market that in the first instance would “drive prices higher”, said Habeck of the Green party.
However Germany’s power demands could be “compensated” with other energy sources and suppliers, including an accelerated renewables push set out by the government, he said.
Germany has chosen a negative economic impact, including more inflation, to achieve what, precisely? To make the USA even happier?
Russia Has Had Enough
The Russians have insisted that NATO in Ukraine is a red line for them that cannot be crossed. The USA has called their bluff and Putin is now beginning to show his hand.
Despite Ukraine being technically ineligible for NATO entry due to having border disputes with Russia (Crimea, Donbass), it has undergone a ‘stealth NATO’ in recent years, in which US/UK and other advisors are training Ukrainian forces, and are arming them as well. The Russian fear is that they will use this to attack the inferior Donbass forces, creating a massive refugee crisis for Russia, and a loss of face for Putin.
Up until two days ago, Russia has insisted that the Donbass remain a part of Ukraine, but that its incorporation be guided by the Minsk Agreement. Minsk was dead a long time ago, as Ukraine refused to talk to the separatists, but is now de jure dead as Russia has recognized the two breakaway republics there. By doing this, Russia is creating client states like it already has in Georgia and Moldova. These serve not just as tampon zones, but allow Russia to negate formal entry of these countries into antagonistic organizations.
The precedent for recognizing these breakaway republics was set by the USA when it detached Kosovo from then Yugoslavia, and recognized its Universal Declaration of Independence a few years later. The 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia is what turned Russia away from the West, famously symbolized by then Premier Primakov ordering his jet to turn back to Moscow. It was at this point that the USA tore up international law. Albanian freedom from Serbian rule in Kosovo has now come at the cost of the loss of Crimea and Donbass to Russia.
Vladimir Putin’s speech on Monday reflected the exasperation with the West and the USA in particular. The most important highlights were:
- The USA is agreement incapable (meaning it will constantly renege as it changes administrations)
- Russia expects sanctions no matter what it does
- The USA does not respect Russian national security concerns
For example:
So for Russia, this is apparently an existential crisis. “Many Ukrainian airfields are located close to our borders. NATO tactical aircraft stationed here, including carriers of high-precision weapons, will be able to hit our territory to the depth of the Volgograd-Kazan-Samara-Astrakhan line. The deployment of radar reconnaissance assets on the territory of Ukraine will allow NATO to tightly control the airspace of Russia right up to the Urals.”
The complete rejection of all Russian points by the USA seems to have now cemented the final victory in Moscow of the Siloviki (state security chiefs) over the westernizers, with the most western of faces throwing in the towel:
Dmitry Medvedev @MedvedevRussiaEGerman Chancellor Olaf Scholz has issued an order to halt the process of certifying the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Well. Welcome to the brave new world where Europeans are very soon going to pay €2.000 for 1.000 cubic meters of natural gas!February 22nd 20223,288 Retweets7,563 Likes
This represents the final break of Russia with the West, a break that it has been preparing for now for years. It has amassed a massive foreign wealth currency reserve (north of $600 billion USD), and has sanctions-proofed its economy, ironically thanks to US-sanctions regime forcing it to discipline itself by ways such as import-substitution.
Putin and Xi recently met and with 100% certainty have coordinated their recent actions and reactions. Little wonder, as the USA continues to push Russia into the arms of China.
Russia’s so far unwillingness to invade the rest of Ukraine while recognizing the two breakaway Donbass republics has wrongfooted many in the West. This represents a tactical victory for Russia, as it now increases its buffer zone in Ukraine. But it does not yet resolve the question regarding rump Ukraine and NATO. Russia might now feel the temptation to resolve this issue once and for all. This conflict is far from over.
The USA has also achieved a tactical victory in that it managed to secure itself the cancellation of Nordstream 2 by creating a win-win for itself: Putin acts, NS2 gets cancelled. Putin doesn’t act, NATO moves closer to Moscow and Volgograd, and he loses face.
Tactical victories are tactical for a reason. The strategic perspective is more interesting because it is rather obvious that Russia has moved closer to China. People are left wondering how the Americans plan to take on both Moscow and Beijing at the same time as the US pivots to Asia.
Trying to contain both of these nuclear powers reeks of hubris and detachment from reality. This detachment has become more and more pronounced lately, with the hilarious collapse of the US-backed forces in Afghanistan last summer a prime example.
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Wichita Lineman
Back When My Hair Was Short
“The Batman” offre une solide entrée de super-héros mais ne parvient pas à commenter les difficultés de la vie trans dans une Ukraine déchirée par la guerre
J’étais en première ligne pour voir The Batman cette semaine, même si j’avais acheté mes billets et réservé ma place il y a des semaines. Le théâtre où j’allais, malgré mes nombreuses lettres de protestation, autorisait l’achat de billets par les non-vaccinés. Ugh, je sais, mais j’ai choisi de regarder au-delà d’une manière ou d’une autre, car mon fandom Batman a exigé que je le voie ce soir-là.
Le film offrait une solide entrée de super-héros. Oui, cela a touché tout ce que vous vous attendez généralement à voir dans un film de Batman. Un Bruce Wayne maussade et en conflit aux prises avec la justice et la vengeance contre la pègre criminelle de Gotham City. Les visuels ont parfaitement capturé l’esthétique de la ville granuleuse et morne apparemment enveloppée dans l’obscurité perpétuelle. Et contrairement à ses prédécesseurs, The Batman capture la véritable sensation de film noir qui est au cœur de l’histoire du croisé capé. Même les méchants ont fait leur part en mettant à rude épreuve la boussole morale de Batman, en le forçant à mettre ses talents de détective à l’épreuve et en propulsant le personnage vers de nouveaux sommets.
Mais devinez-moi ça ? À quel point serait-il difficile pour Hollywood de simplement reconnaître les difficultés d’être trans dans une Ukraine déchirée par la guerre tout en redémarrant la franchise Batman?
Bien sûr, nous avons réussi à donner un nouveau look à la batmobile, mais où est le commentaire sur ce que cela doit être pour la communauté transgenre au milieu d’une invasion par la Russie ? Comment doivent-ils se sentir en ce moment, pour ne pas être représentés dans un grand film ? Ils mènent littéralement une guerre dans une guerre et le mieux que vous puissiez faire est d’ajouter des flammes à l’échappement de la batmobile ? C’est tout à fait répréhensible.
Bien sûr, la communauté trans craint pour sa vie alors que sa ville est bombardée et bombardée par une superpuissance nucléaire, mais ce n’est rien comparé à la peur constante que quelqu’un découvre votre véritable identité. ASTUCE ASTUCE Batman ! Voyez à quel point cela n’aurait pas été difficile de reconnaître et d’empathie avec les luttes de vivre une double vie? Mais non, au lieu de cela, le seul objectif du film est d’adapter fidèlement l’histoire de Batman au grand écran. Par honte.
Les fans disent que tout ce qu’ils veulent, c’est une histoire convaincante, mais pourquoi ne pas mentionner les réalités des minorités déjà opprimées qui sont simultanément opprimées davantage par leur propre gouvernement ainsi que par un forgein ? Honteux. Ou que diriez-vous d’intrigues qui commentent l’injustice d’être une femme trans dont la carte d’identité indique toujours qu’elle est un homme leur interdisant de fuir l’Ukraine ? Honnêtement, ça me rend malade de penser que j’ai soutenu Batman aussi longtemps que je l’ai fait. Batman est censé être là pour nous tous.
Dans sa durée de près de 3 heures, comment le réalisateur Matt Reeves n’a-t-il pas pris un moment pour explorer comment l’invasion russe a entravé la scène de rencontres ukrainienne déjà difficile pour la communauté trans ? Où peuvent-ils se retrouver en toute sécurité sans la peur de la mort ? Où peuvent-ils organiser des spectacles de drag queen qui ne sont pas en ruine ? Disposent-ils du Wi-Fi ? Nous ne le saurons peut-être jamais car de telles questions ne sont jamais abordées par The Batman qui est trop occupé à contrecarrer les plans du Pingouin et à résoudre les mystères de Riddler.
Ce film a peut-être fait avancer l’intrigue pour les justiciers masculins, mais n’a rien fait pour les personnes transgenres piégées en Ukraine.
1 étoile sur 5.
‘The Batman’ Delivers A Solid Superhero Entry But Fails To Comment On The Hardships Of Trans Lives In War-Torn Ukraine
The Batman (2022)
Directed by Matt Reeves
Action/Adventure – PG-13 – 2h 56m
I was first in line to see The Batman this week, even though I purchased my tickets and reserved my seat weeks ago. The theater I went to, despite my many letters of protest, allowed tickets to be purchased by the unvaccinated. Ugh, I know—but I chose to look past it somehow, as my Batman fandom demanded I see it that night.
The movie offered a solid superhero entry. Yes, it hit everything you typically expect to see in a Batman film. A brooding, conflicted Bruce Wayne grappling with bringing down justice and vengeance upon the criminal underworld of Gotham City. The visuals perfectly captured the aesthetic of the gritty, dreary city seemingly cloaked in perpetual darkness. And unlike its predecessors, The Batman captures the true film noir feel that is central to the caped crusader’s story. Even the villains did their part—straining Batman’s moral compass, forcing him to put his detective skills to the test, and propelling the character to new heights.
But riddle me this? How hard would it be for Hollywood to simply acknowledge the hardships of being trans in war-torn Ukraine while rebooting the Batman franchise?
Sure—we’ve managed to give the batmobile a new look, but where’s the commentary on what it must be like for the transgender community admidst an invasion by Russia? How must they be feeling right now, to not be represented in a major motion picture? They are literally fighting a war within a war and the best you can do is add flames to the batmobile’s exhaust? It’s utterly reprehensible.
Sure—the trans community fears for their lives as their city is bombed and shelled by a nuclear superpower, but that’s nothing compared to the constant fear of someone discovering your true identity. HINT HINT Batman! See how not hard that would have been to acknowledge and empathize with the struggles of living a double life? But no—instead, the film’s only focus is on faithfully adapting the Batman story to the big screen. For shame.
Fans say all they want is a compelling story, but why not mention the realities of already oppressed minorities who are being simultaneously oppressed further by their own government as well as a forgein one? Disgraceful. Or how about plot lines that comment on the unfairness of being a trans woman whose ID still says they’re a man prohibiting them from fleeing Ukraine? Honestly, it makes me sick to think I supported Batman as long as I have. Batman is supposed to be there for all of us.
In its nearly 3-hour runtime, how did director Matt Reeves not take a moment to explore how the Russian invasion has hindered the already difficult Ukrainian dating scene for the trans community? Where can they safely meet up without the fear of death? Where can they host drag queen shows that are not in ruins? Do they have WIFI? We may never know as such questions are never addressed by The Batman who’s too busy thwarting the plans of the Penguin and solving Riddler’s mysteries.
This movie may have moved the plot forward for straight while male vigilantes, but did nothing for transgender individuals trapped in Ukraine.
1 star out of 5.
ការពិនិត្យឡើងវិញ ‘The Batman’៖ ពិតជាភាពយន្តវែងដែលយើងបានឃើញច្រើនដងពីមុនមក
អាស្រ័យលើភាពយន្តណាដែលអ្នកបញ្ចូល និងបញ្ចុះតម្លៃលក្ខណៈពិសេសដែលមានចលនា នេះជាភាពយន្ត Batman ទីប្រាំបី ឬទីប្រាំបួនចាប់តាំងពីឆ្នាំ 1989។ វាក៏ជាសិទ្ធិផ្តាច់មុខរបស់ Batman ទីប្រាំផងដែរ? ការចាប់ផ្តើមឡើងវិញទីប្រាំ?
ពេលកំពុងអង្គុយមើលរឿង Se7en ឡើងវិញរយៈពេលបីម៉ោងនេះ (ប៉ុន្តែអ្នកដឹងទេថាជាមួយ Batman) ហើយយូរបន្ទាប់ពីគូទរបស់ខ្ញុំបានស្លាប់ ខ្ញុំបានដឹងថាឥឡូវនេះមានមនុស្សពេញវ័យដើរជុំវិញ – មនុស្សដែលមានអាយុ 30 ឆ្នាំដែលមិនចាំ អាមេរិកដែលធ្លាប់ទទួលយក New.
ខ្ញុំ? ខ្ញុំចាំថា។ ខ្ញុំមួយរយ។
នោះជាប្រទេសដែលយើងធ្លាប់ជាប្រទេសមើលទៅមុខដែលស្រឡាញ់ថ្មី។ ប្រទេសនោះអស្ចារ្យ និងមានថាមពល។ ប្រទេសនោះបានជ្រើសរើស John F. Kennedy និង Ronald Reagan និង Bill Clinton ។ ប្រទេសនោះនឹងមិនដែលបានចូលទៅក្នុងវង់មរណៈរបស់ Bush-Clinton-Clinton-Bush-Bush-Biden-And-Maybe-Clinton-ម្តងទៀតទេ។
មីគឺជាអ្វីគ្រប់យ៉ាងនៅអាមេរិក—ជារឿងសំខាន់បំផុត។ មនុស្សគ្រប់គ្នាទាមទារថ្មី។ ត្រលប់ទៅអាមេរិកមុនឆ្នាំ 1990 ។ អាមេរិកអស្ចារ្យណាស់។ ជាឧទាហរណ៍ មនុស្សគ្រប់រូបចង់បានម៉ូដថ្មី។ លទ្ធផល? ទស្សវត្សរ៍នីមួយៗមានស្ទីលប្លែកៗរបស់ខ្លួន។ ប៉ុន្តែមើលអាមេរិកសព្វថ្ងៃ។ តាមស្ទីល យើងមិនអាចបែងចែកបានពីការបរបាញ់ឆន្ទៈល្អ។ ជឿឬមិនជឿ ប្រទេសនេះនឹងរំភើបចំពោះរថយន្តម៉ូដែលថ្មីបំផុតជារៀងរាល់ឆ្នាំ។ នេះជារឿងធំមួយ។ ត្រលប់មកវិញ អ្នកអាចបែងចែកឡានមួយពីឡានមួយទៀត។ សព្វថ្ងៃនេះ រថយន្តទាំងអស់របស់យើងមើលទៅដូចគ្នា ហើយមានបួនពណ៌ដែលពីរពណ៌ប្រផេះ។ កុំឱ្យខ្ញុំចាប់ផ្តើមតន្ត្រី។ ទូរទស្សន៍ជាចម្បងមានសិទ្ធិផ្តាច់មុខចំនួនប្រាំបី ដែលក្នុងនោះ 5 គឺច្បាប់ និងសណ្តាប់ធ្នាប់។ ភាពយន្តគឺអាក្រក់បំផុត។ ខ្ញុំចាំថាបានឃើញ Star Wars នៅអាយុ 11 ឆ្នាំ Superman និង Halloween នៅអាយុ 12 ឆ្នាំ ជា Jurassic Park ដំបូងនៅអាយុ 26 ឆ្នាំ។ បទពិសោធន៍ដែលមិនអាចបំភ្លេចបានទាំងអស់។ ថ្មីក៏មិនចាប់ផ្ដើមចាប់យកដែរ។ ឥឡូវនេះខ្ញុំមានអាយុ 56 ឆ្នាំ ហើយយើងនៅតែទទួលបានវគ្គបន្ត។ នរណាម្នាក់គួរតែប្រាប់ខ្ញុំថា Star Wars នឹងទាមទារការប្តេជ្ញាចិត្តរយៈពេល 45 ឆ្នាំ។
ឥឡូវនេះយើងមានខ្សែភាពយន្តចំនួន 9 និងចាប់ផ្តើមឡើងវិញចំនួន 5 នៅក្នុង Batman ។
នេះគឺជាគ្រាប់។
តើនៅសល់អ្វីដែលត្រូវធ្វើជាមួយ Batman — សុំទោស៖ The Batman — ខ្ញុំចង់និយាយថា ក្រៅពីដាក់ “the” នៅពីមុខ “Batman” ហើយធ្វើឱ្យវាមានរយៈពេលបីម៉ោងជាមួយនឹងទង្វើប្រាំ តើអ្នកអាចធ្វើអ្វីបានទៀត?
អ្នកដឹកនាំរឿងទាំងអស់ Matt Reeves ធ្វើនៅទីនេះគឺថតឡើងវិញ Se7ev ជាមួយ Batman ក្នុងតួនាទី Brad Pitt និងគណៈកម្មការអនាគត Gordon/Alfred ក្នុងតួនាទី Morgan Freeman ។ បីម៉ោងដែលខ្ញុំអង្គុយនៅទីនោះគិត នេះមិនអីទេ ប៉ុន្តែខ្ញុំមិនត្រឹមតែបានឃើញវាពីមុនទេ ខ្ញុំក៏ធ្លាប់ឃើញវារាប់សិបដងពីមុនមកដែរ។
តើយើងមិនបានទទួលរឿង Gotham ដែលអាក្រក់ប៉ុន្មានឆ្នាំមុនជាមួយ Joker ទេ? ដូចជានៅ Batman គាត់ធ្វើរឿង Batman ដូចគ្នា ប៉ុន្តែលើកនេះគាត់ធ្វើវាបានបីម៉ោង។ បីម៉ោង!
នៅក្នុងឈុតនោះ Pattinson គឺជា Batman ល្អណាស់។ ក្រៅពីឈុតនេះ គាត់ជា Emo សុទ្ធ ហើយប្រសិនបើអ្នកមើលទៅជិត អ្នកអាចឃើញ Vidal Sassoon ដោយគ្រាន់តែបិទកាមេរ៉ា។ សក់ដូចជាអូមីហ្គាដដែលសក់ខឹង។
ញុំនឹងនិយាយនេះ… យ៉ាងហោចណាស់ The Batman មិនមានសិចទេ។ Zoë Kravitz ត្រូវបានអនុញ្ញាតឱ្យនាំយកកំដៅខ្លះ។ ប៉ុន្តែជាថ្មីម្តងទៀត ការពិតដែលថាការរួមភេទតិចតួចនៅក្នុងខ្សែភាពយន្តមួយឥឡូវនេះគ្រាន់តែជាភាពថ្មីថ្មោងប៉ុណ្ណោះដែលបង្ហាញឱ្យឃើញពីភាពមិនច្បាស់លាស់ ការអនុលោមភាព និង Applebee ដែលយើងបានអនុញ្ញាតឱ្យវប្បធម៌របស់យើងក្លាយជា។
ដូច្នេះមានឃាតករសៀរៀល ហើយគាត់ជាអ្នកសម្លាប់សៀរៀល ហើយវាតែងតែងងឹត ហើយមានភ្លៀងធ្លាក់ច្រើន ហើយ Batman បានសហការគ្នាជាមួយ Gordon ហើយមនុស្សស្លាប់ ហើយឃាតករសៀរៀលបន្សល់ទុកតម្រុយនៅពីក្រោយ ហើយបង្កើតទស្សនាវដ្តី gajillion ហើយក្បាលរឿងនេះ – ក្នុងប្រអប់មួយមានទឹកច្រើន។
Batman ត្រូវបានផលិតឡើងយ៉ាងប៉ិនប្រសប់ គ្មានសំណួរអ្វីឡើយ ហើយក្នុងចំណោម 176 នាទីរបស់វា មានការដេញតាមរថយន្តរយៈពេល 5 នាទីដ៏អស្ចារ្យ។ ប៉ុន្តែក្រៅពី Zoë Kravitz នៅក្នុងខោទ្រនាប់របស់នាង នោះគឺជាពេលតែមួយគត់ដែល Batman មានអារម្មណ៍ដូចជាការប្រើប្រាស់ពេលវេលារបស់ខ្ញុំប្រកបដោយប្រសិទ្ធភាព។ គ្មានអារម្មណ៍នៃភាពបន្ទាន់ ឬគ្រោះថ្នាក់ គ្មានសន្ទុះពិតប្រាកដ – ទោះបីជាមនុស្សម្នាក់ត្រូវបានកំណត់គោលដៅសម្រាប់ការស្លាប់ដូច Saw ជារៀងរាល់ថ្ងៃក៏ដោយ។ រឿងនេះគ្រាន់តែដើរលេងក្នុងភ្លៀងប៉ុណ្ណោះ ហើយប្រសិនបើមានប្រធានបទ ខ្ញុំនឹកវាណាស់។
សូមរីករាយ។
Overextending and Unbalancing Russia – Rand Corporation – 2019
Assessing the Impact of Cost-Imposing Options
by James Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen, Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLuca, Forrest E. Morgan, Howard J. Shatz, Brent Williams
RESEARCHBRIEF
This brief summarizes a report that comprehensively examines nonviolent, cost-imposing options that the United States and its allies could pursue across economic, political, and military areas to stress—overextend and unbalance—Russia’s economy and armed forces and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad. Some of the options examined are clearly more promising than others, but any would need to be evaluated in terms of the overall U.S. strategy for dealing with Russia, which neither the report nor this brief has attempted to do.
The maxim that “Russia is never so strong nor so weak as it appears” remains as true in the current century as it was in the 19th and 20th.Share on Twitter
Today’s Russia suffers from many vulnerabilities—oil and gas prices well below peak that have caused a drop in living standards, economic sanctions that have furthered that decline, an aging and soon-to-be-declining population, and increasing authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin’s now-continued rule. Such vulnerabilities are coupled with deep-seated (if exaggerated) anxieties about the possibility of Western-inspired regime change, loss of great power status, and even military attack.
Despite these vulnerabilities and anxieties, Russia remains a powerful country that still manages to be a U.S. peer competitor in a few key domains. Recognizing that some level of competition with Russia is inevitable, RAND researchers conducted a qualitative assessment of “cost-imposing options” that could unbalance and overextend Russia. Such cost-imposing options could place new burdens on Russia, ideally heavier burdens than would be imposed on the United States for pursuing those options.
The work builds on the concept of long-term strategic competition developed during the Cold War, some of which originated at RAND. A seminal 1972 RAND report posited that the United States needed to shift its strategic thinking away from trying to stay ahead of the Soviet Union in all dimensions and toward trying to control the competition and channel it into areas of U.S. advantage. If this shift could be made successfully, the report concluded, the United States could prompt the Soviet Union to shift its limited resources into areas that posed less of a threat.
The new report applies this concept to today’s Russia. A team of RAND experts developed economic, geopolitical, ideological, informational, and military options and qualitatively assessed them in terms of their likelihood of success in extending Russia, their benefits, and their risks and costs.
Economic Cost-Imposing Measures
Expanding U.S. energy production would stress Russia’s economy, potentially constraining its government budget and, by extension, its defense spending. By adopting policies that expand world supply and depress global prices, the United States can limit Russian revenue. Doing so entails little cost or risk, produces second-order benefits for the U.S. economy, and does not need multilateral endorsement.
Imposing deeper trade and financial sanctions would also likely degrade the Russian economy, especially if such sanctions are comprehensive and multilateral. Thus, their effectiveness will depend on the willingness of other countries to join in such a process. But sanctions come with costs and, depending on their severity, considerable risks.
Increasing Europe’s ability to import gas from suppliers other than Russia could economically extend Russia and buffer Europe against Russian energy coercion. Europe is slowly moving in this direction by building regasification plants for liquefied natural gas (LNG). But to be truly effective, this option would need global LNG markets to become more flexible than they already are and would need LNG to become more price-competitive with Russian gas.
Encouraging the emigration from Russia of skilled labor and well-educated youth has few costs or risks and could help the United States and other receiving countries and hurt Russia, but any effects—both positive for receiving countries and negative for Russia—would be difficult to notice except over a very long period. This option also has a low likelihood of extending Russia.
| Economic Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expand U.S. energy production | HIGH | HIGH | LOW |
| Impose deeper trade and financial sanctions | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH |
| Increase Europe’s ability to import LNG from sources other than Russia | MODERATE | HIGH | MODERATE |
| Encourage emigration from Russia of skilled labor and well-educated youth | LOW | LOW | LOW |
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.
Geopolitical Cost-Imposing Measures
Syrian Democratic Forces trainees, representing an equal number of Arab and Kurdish volunteers, stand in formation at their graduation ceremony in northern Syria, August 9, 2017.
Photo by Sgt. Mitchell Ryan/DoD
Providing lethal aid to Ukraine would exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability. But any increase in U.S. military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would have significant advantages.
Increasing support to the Syrian rebels could jeopardize other U.S. policy priorities, such as combating radical Islamic terrorism, and could risk further destabilizing the entire region. Furthermore, this option might not even be feasible, given the radicalization, fragmentation, and decline of the Syrian opposition.
Promoting liberalization in Belarus likely would not succeed and could provoke a strong Russian response, one that would result in a general deterioration of the security environment in Europe and a setback for U.S. policy.
Expanding ties in the South Caucasus—competing economically with Russia—would be difficult because of geography and history.
Reducing Russian influence in Central Asia would be very difficult and could prove costly. Increased engagement is unlikely to extend Russia much economically and likely to be disproportionately costly for the United States.
Flip Transnistria and expel the Russian troops from the region would be a blow to Russian prestige, but it would also save Moscow money and quite possibly impose additional costs on the United States and its allies.
| Geopolitical Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Provide lethal aid to Ukraine | MODERATE | HIGH | HIGH |
| Increase support to the Syrian rebels | LOW | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Promote liberalization in Belarus | LOW | HIGH | HIGH |
| Expand ties in the South Caucasus | LOW | LOW | MODERATE |
| Reduce Russian influence in Central Asia | LOW | LOW | MODERATE |
| Flipping Transnistria | LOW | LOW | MODERATE |
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.
Ideological and Informational Cost-Imposing Measures
Muscovites protesting the war in Ukraine and Russia’s support of separatism in the Crimea on the Circular Boulevards in Moscow on March 15, 2014.
Photo by Dmitry Vereshchagin/Adobe Stock
Diminishing faith in the Russian electoral system would be difficult because of state control over most media sources. Doing so could increase discontent with the regime, but there are serious risks that the Kremlin could increase repression or lash out and pursue a diversionary conflict abroad that might run counter to Western interests.
Creating the perception that the regime is not pursuing the public interest could focus on widespread, large-scale corruption and further challenge the legitimacy of the state. But it is hard to assess whether political volatility and protests would lead to a more extended Russia—less able or inclined to threaten Western interests abroad—or to a Russia more inclined to lash out in retaliation or to distract, making this a high-risk option.
Encouraging domestic protests and other nonviolent resistance would focus on distracting or destabilizing the Russian regime and reducing the likelihood that it would pursue aggressive actions abroad, but the risks are high and it would be difficult for Western governments to directly increase the incidence or intensity of anti-regime activities in Russia.
Undermining Russia’s image abroad would focus on diminishing Russian standing and influence, thus undercutting regime claims of restoring Russia to its former glory. Further sanctions, the removal of Russia from non-UN international forums, and boycotting such events as the World Cup could be implemented by Western states and would damage Russian prestige. But the extent to which these steps would damage Russian domestic stability is uncertain.
While none of these measures has a high probability of success, any or all of them would prey on the Russian regime’s deepest anxieties and might be employed as a deterrent threat to diminish Russia’s active disinformation and subversion campaigns abroad.
| Ideological and Informational Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Diminish faith in the Russian electoral system | LOW | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Create the perception that the regime is not pursuing the public interest | MODERATE | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Encourage domestic protests and other nonviolent resistance | LOW | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Undermine Russia’s image abroad | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE |
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.
Air and Space Cost-Imposing Measures
Marines assigned to the Thunderbolts of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 251 remove a training AGM-88 HARM from an F/A-18C Hornet on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71).
Photo by Anthony N. Hilkowski/DVIDS
Reposturing bombers within easy striking range of key Russian strategic targets has a high likelihood of success and would certainly get Moscow’s attention and raise Russian anxieties; the costs and risks of this option are low as long as the bombers are based out of range of most of Russia’s theater ballistic and ground-based cruise missiles.
Reposturing fighters so that they are closer to their targets than bombers as a way to achieve higher sortie rates to compensate for their smaller payloads would likely concern Moscow even more than reposturing bombers, but the likelihood of success is low and risks are high. Because each aircraft would need to fly multiple sorties during a conventional conflict, Russian leaders would probably be confident that they could destroy many fighters on the ground and shut down their deployment airfields early on with few or no additions to their missile inventory.
Deploying additional tactical nuclear weapons to locations in Europe and Asia could heighten Russia’s anxiety enough to significantly increase investments in its air defenses. In conjunction with the bomber option, it has a high likelihood of success, but deploying more such weapons might lead Moscow to react in ways contrary to U.S. and allied interests.
Repositioning U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense systems to better engage Russian ballistic missiles would also alarm Moscow but would likely be the least effective option because Russia could easily saturate current systems and any planned upgrades with a small percentage of its existing missile inventory, leaving many missiles still available to hold U.S. and allied targets at risk.
There are also ways to get Russia to extend itself in strategic competition. In terms of benefits, such developments would exploit Moscow’s demonstrated fear of U.S. airpower capabilities and doctrines. Developing new low-observable, long-range bombers, or simply adding significantly more of types that are already available or programmed (B-2s and B-21s) would be worrisome for Moscow, as would developing autonomous or remotely piloted strike aircraft and producing them in high numbers. All options would likely incentivize Moscow to devote ever-greater resources to making its command and control systems harder, more mobile, and more redundant.
A key risk of these options is being drawn into arms races that result in cost-imposing strategies directed against the United States. For example, investing in ballistic missile defense systems and space-based weapons would alarm Moscow, but Russia could defend against such developments by taking measures that would probably be considerably cheaper than the costs of these systems to the United States.
As for likelihood of success, some options are good cost-imposing strategies, but some—such as investing more in HARMs or other electronic warfare technologies—are clearly better than others, and some approaches should be avoided, such as those that focus on space-based weapons or ballistic missile defense systems.
The United States might goad Russia into a costly arms race by breaking out of the nuclear arms control regime, but the benefits are unlikely to outweigh U.S. costs. The financial costs of a nuclear arms race would probably be as high for the United States as they would be for Russia, perhaps higher. But the more serious costs would be political and strategic.
| Air and Space/Nuclear Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Option 1: Changing air and space force posture and operations | |||
| Reposture bombers | HIGH | MODERATE | LOW |
| Reposture fighters | LOW | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Deploy additional tactical nuclear weapons | HIGH | LOW | HIGH |
| Reposition U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense systems | LOW | LOW | MODERATE |
| Option 2: Increasing aerospace research and development (R&D) | |||
| Invest more in low-observable aircraft | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Invest more in autonomous or remotely piloted aircraft | HIGH | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Invest more in long-range strike aircraft and missiles | HIGH | HIGH | MODERATE |
| Invest more in longer-range high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs) | HIGH | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Invest more in new electronic warfare technologies | MODERATE | MODERATE | LOW |
| Focus on long-range, precision-guided conventional missiles (e.g., conventional prompt global strike) | MODERATE | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Focus on space-based weapons | LOW | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Focus on “spaceplanes” | LOW TO MODERATE | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Focus on small satellites | LOW | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Option 3: Increasing air and missile components of the nuclear triad | |||
| Break out of the nuclear arms control regime | LOW | MODERATE | HIGH |
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.
Maritime Cost-Imposing Measures
A U.S. sailor aboard the guided missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) fires a torpedo at a simulated target during Valiant Shield 2014 in the Pacific Ocean September 18, 2014.
Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Declan Barnes/DVIDS
Increasing U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence in Russia’s operating areas could force Russia to increase its naval investments, diverting investments from potentially more dangerous areas. But the size of investment required to reconstitute a true blue-water naval capability makes it unlikely that Russia could be compelled or enticed to do so.
Increasing naval R&D efforts would focus on developing new weapons that allow U.S. submarines to threaten a broader set of targets or enhance their ability to threaten Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which could impose anti-submarine warfare costs on Russia. There are limited risks, but success depends on being able to develop these capabilities and on whether they are sufficiently capable of influencing Russian expenditures.
Shifting nuclear posture toward SSBNs would entail increasing the percentage of the U.S. nuclear triad assigned to SSBNs by increasing the size of that fleet. While it might force Russia to invest in capabilities that can operate in a blue-water environment in two oceans and would reduce risks to U.S. strategic posture, the option is unlikely to entice Russia into changing its strategy and, thus, extending itself.
Checking the Black Sea buildup would involve deploying strengthened North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) anti-access and area denial over the Black Sea—perhaps in the form of long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles—to drive up the cost of defending Russian bases in Crimea and lower the benefit to Russia of having seized this area. Russia would certainly mount a vigorous diplomatic and informational campaign to dissuade coastal NATO and non-NATO states from participating. Also, operating in the Black Sea is politically and logistically more difficult for the U.S. Navy than the Russian Navy; it is also more dangerous for the former in a conflict.
| Maritime Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Increase U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence | MODERATE | MODERATE | LOW |
| Increase naval R&D efforts | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Shift nuclear posture toward SSBNs | LOW | LOW | LOW |
| Check the Black Sea buildup | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE |
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.
Land and Multidomain Cost-Imposing Measures
Exercise Artemis Strike was a German-led tactical live-fire exercise with live Patriot and Stinger missiles at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Chania, Greece, from October 31 to November 9, 2017. More than 200 U.S. soldiers and approximately 650 German airmen participated in the realistic training within a combined construct, exercising the rigors associated with force projection and educating operators on their air missile defense systems.
Photo by Anthony Sweeney/DVIDS
Increasing U.S. forces in Europe, increasing European NATO member ground capabilities, and deploying a large number of NATO forces on the Russian border would likely have only limited effects on extending Russia. All the options would enhance deterrence, but the risks vary. A general increase in NATO ground force capabilities in Europe—including closing European NATO member readiness gaps and increasing the number of U.S. forces stationed in traditional locations in Western Europe—would have limited risks. But large-scale deployments on Russia’s borders would increase the risk of conflict with Russia, particularly if perceived as challenging Russia’s position in eastern Ukraine, Belarus, or the Caucasus.
Increasing the size and frequency of NATO exercises in Europe may help to enhance readiness and deterrence, but it is unlikely to prompt a costly Russian response unless the exercises also send risky signals. Large-scale NATO exercises held near Russia’s borders and exercises that practice counterattack or offensive scenarios could be perceived as showing the intent and willingness to consider offensive operations. For example, a NATO exercise simulating a counterattack to retake NATO territory lost to advancing Russian forces might look like an exercise to prepare for an invasion of a piece of Russian territory, such as Kaliningrad.
Developing but not deploying an intermediate-range missile could bring Russia back into conformity with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty but could also prompt an acceleration of Russian missile programs. Withdrawing from that treaty and building the missiles but not deploying them in Europe would add little to U.S. capabilities and would probably prompt Russia to deploy such missiles itself—and, perhaps, invest more in ballistic missile defense. Taking the further step of deploying the missiles to Europe, assuming that NATO allies were willing, would also almost certainly prompt a Russian response, potentially involving substantial resources, or at least the diversion of substantial resources from other defense spending, though it is hard to assess what share would be directed toward defensive capabilities versus offensive or retaliatory ones.
Incremental investments in new technologies to counter Russian air defenses and increase U.S. long-range fires could significantly improve defense and deterrence while compelling increased Russian investment in countermeasures. Investments in more-revolutionary, next-generation technologies could have even greater effects, given the Russian concerns about new physical principles, but depending on the capability, such investments could also risk strategic stability by threatening the Russian regime and leadership security in a crisis.
| Land and Multidomain Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Option 1: Increasing U.S. and NATO land forces in Europe | |||
| Increase U.S. forces in Europe | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Increase European NATO member ground capabilities | LOW | HIGH | LOW |
| Deploy large number of NATO forces on the Russian border | MODERATE | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Option 2: Increasing NATO exercises in Europe | |||
| Increase the size of U.S participation | LOW | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Generate a mass mobilization of European NATO member forces | LOW | HIGH | MODERATE |
| Hold exercises on Russia’s borders | MODERATE | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Hold exercises practicing counterattack or offensive scenarios | MODERATE | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Option 3: Withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty | |||
| Fund a missile development program without withdrawing | MODERATE | LOW | MODERATE |
| Withdraw and build missiles but do not deploy to Europe | HIGH | LOW | MODERATE |
| Withdraw, build missiles, and deploy to Europe | HIGH | MODERATE | HIGH |
| Option 4: Investing in new capabilities to manipulate Russian risk perceptions | |||
| Invest in incremental improvements in counter–anti-access and area denial capabilities (e.g., enhanced Army Tactical Missile Systems, advanced anti-radiation guided missiles) | HIGH | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Invest in revolutionary, swarm counter–anti-access and area denial capabilities | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH |
| Invest in incremental improvements in counter–ground forces/fires (e.g., enhanced Javelin) | LOW | LOW | LOW |
| Invest in revolutionary, unmanned ground forces/fires capabilities | MODERATE | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Invest in weapons based on “new physical principles” (e.g,. directed-energy counter–air-defense weapons) | MODERATE | HIGH | HIGH |
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.
Implications for the Army
The task of “extending Russia” need not fall primarily on the Army or even the U.S. armed forces as a whole. Indeed, the most promising ways to extend Russia—those with the highest benefit, the lowest risk, and greatest likelihood of success—likely fall outside the military domain. Russia is not seeking military parity with the United States and, thus, might simply choose not to respond to some U.S. military actions (e.g., shifts in naval presence); other U.S. military actions (e.g., posturing forces closer to Russia) could ultimately prove more costly to the United States than to Russia. Still, our findings have at least three major implications for the Army.
- The U.S. Army should rebuild its linguistic and analytical expertise on Russia. Because Russia does pose a long-term threat, the Army needs to develop the human capital to engage in this strategic competition.
- The Army should consider investing and encouraging the other services to invest more in capabilities, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems, Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2, longer-range anti-air defense, and other systems designed to counter Russian anti-access and area denial capabilities. The Army also might consider spending some R&D resources on less-mature, more-futuristic systems (e.g., swarm unmanned aerial vehicles or remote combat vehicles). While these measures would likely be insufficient in themselves to greatly extend Russia, they would benefit U.S. deterrence efforts and could augment a broader whole-of-government policy.
- Even if the Army were not directly involved in extending Russia per se, it would play a key role in mitigating the possible blowback. All the options to extend Russia incur some risk. As a result, enhancing U.S. deterrence posture in Europe and increasing U.S. military capabilities (e.g., an enhanced Javelin or active protection systems for Army vehicles) might need to go hand in hand with any move to extend Russia, as a way of hedging against the chance of tensions with Russia escalating into conflict.
Conclusions
The most-promising options to “extend Russia” are those that directly address its vulnerabilities, anxieties, and strengths, exploiting areas of weakness while undermining Russia’s current advantages. In that regard, Russia’s greatest vulnerability, in any competition with the United States, is its economy, which is comparatively small and highly dependent on energy exports. Russian leadership’s greatest anxiety stems from the stability and durability of the regime, and Russia’s greatest strengths are in the military and info-war realms. The table below draws from the earlier tables to identify the most-promising options.
Most of the options discussed, including those listed here, are in some sense escalatory, and most would likely prompt some Russian counterescalation. Thus, besides the specific risks associated with each option, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. This means that every option must be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia will bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States will, both sides will have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is not a sufficient basis in most cases to consider the options discussed here. Rather, the options must be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation.
| Most-Promising Cost-Imposing Options | Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia | Benefits | Costs and Risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Expand U.S. energy production | HIGH | HIGH | LOW |
| Impose deeper trade and financial sanctions | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH |
| Increase U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence | MODERATE | MODERATE | LOW |
| Reposture bombers | HIGH | MODERATE | LOW |
| Invest more in autonomous or remotely piloted aircraft | HIGH | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Invest more in long-range strike aircraft and missiles | HIGH | HIGH | MODERATE |
| Invest more in longer-range HARMs | HIGH | MODERATE | MODERATE |
| Invest more in new electronic warfare technologies | MODERATE | MODERATE | LOW |
……………….
The New York Times’ Disgraceful and Deceitful Attack on Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. – by Edward Curtin – 2 March 2022
• 2,300 WORDS •
The New York Times, floundering in the deep waters of truth and desperately trying to stay afloat in the shallows by continuing its history of lying for its CIA masters, has just published a front page of propaganda worthy of the finest house organs of totalitarian regimes. Right below its February 26, 2022 headline denouncing Russia and Putin as evil dogs pursuant to the American empire’s dictates concerning Ukraine, it posts an unflattering photo of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. sandwiched between American flags with the title of its hit piece, “A Kennedy’s Crusade Against Covid Vaccines Anguishes Family and Friends.”
It’s an exquisite juxtaposition: Putin as Hitler and Kennedy as a junior demon, suggestive of the relationship between C. S. Lewis’s Screwtape and his nephew Wormwood in The Screwtape Letters. Evil personified.
The Times is big into anguish these days, not only for Nazis in Ukraine and upper class apartment hunters who can’t find a place for less than a few million, but for Robert Kennedy, Jr.’s family and friends. It’s very touching. That his sister, Kerry Kennedy, would harshly criticize him once again is genuinely pathetic, but of course she has to add how much she loves him, ostensibly to take the sting out of her inability to remain sisterly silent.
If he is so wrong about his work with Children’s Health Defense and his book , The Real Anthony Fauci: Bill Gates, Big Pharma, and the Global War on Democracy and Public Health, rather than ripping him to the press, why doesn’t she or her siblings, who agree with her, write a comprehensive article or book refuting his facts?
They don’t because they can’t; so the next best thing is to criticize their brother to media glad for any way to disparage the Kennedys. One senses a very weird masochistic family dynamic at work.
(cont. https://archive.ph/NbP5d )
(Republished from Edward Curtin )
How Politics Undermines Understanding of Vaccine Hesitancy – by Musa al-Gharbi – 23 Feb 2022
Vaccine hesitancy is not a result of partisan lean, conspiracy theories or fake news. Instead, it seems to be driven primarily by perceived sociological distance from those ‘calling the shots.’
Contemporary journalists and social researchers alike tend to be overwhelmingly aligned with the Democratic Party and the ideological “left.” As I explore in my book, they also tend to be drawn from a particular demographic slice of society, hailing from urban (and, to a lesser extent, suburban) areas and from families with above-average levels of financial and cultural capital. They skew disproportionately white as well. This homogeneity in backgrounds and beliefs often limits and corrupts our understanding of the social world, influencing the questions that are asked, the means used to pursue those questions, how data is interpreted and analyzed, how findings are portrayed to others, and how others evaluate and utilize one’s research. Explorations of morally and politically charged phenomena seem especially susceptible to being distorted by the non-representativeness of knowledge-producing institutions themselves.
Vaccine hesitancy is a case in point. Both scholars and journalists often seem to misunderstand or misrepresent both who is resistant to public health guidance and why — often advancing inaccurate and pernicious but politically convenient narratives.
With respect to the “why” question, for instance, although anti-vaxxers seem to dominate the public discourse and imagination on vaccine hesitancy, in truth, few of the unvaccinated are expressly against vaccines per se — neither in general, nor with COVID-19 in particular. Moreover, the concerns that people convey in order to explain their skepticism of authorities are often quite reasonable.
Even among outright anti-vaxxers, behind their eccentric rhetoric lie apprehensions voiced by many other vaccine-hesitant Americans. Among them:
- Concerns about whether the vaccine is as safe and effective as experts claim
- Concerns about apparent conflicts of interest and perverse incentives among policymakers, experts, and “Big Pharma”
- Concerns about the lack of transparency from authorities with respect to the uncertainties in their claims, possible downsides of their guidance, dissenting expert opinions, and so forth
Critics often get so wrapped up in mocking the apparent absurdity of conspiracy theories that they are blinded to the legitimate concerns that typically undergird them.
The Bill Gates microchip theory, for instance, straightforwardly reflects worries about the safety of the vaccines, paired with concerns about conflicts of interest and perverse incentives among experts, policymakers, and pharmaceutical companies. They share unease on these matters with many other vaccine hesitant people who do not wrap their apprehension in a conspiracy theory. Yet rather than recognizing and attempting to speak to the underlying and understandable concerns shared across vaccine hesitant people, many choose to focus on the more sensational aspects of conspiracy theorists’ narratives in order to paint virtually all vaccine-hesitant people as irrational.
In addition to misrepresentations about why people are vaccine hesitant, there also seem to be broad mischaracterizations around who the vaccine hesitant are. One common assumption is that vaccine skeptics are overwhelmingly Make America Great Again (MAGA) whites juiced up on Fox News misinformation. This narrative has some face-validity problems that have not been well addressed.
Consider, for instance, the reality that only about 10-15% of voting-age Americans watch even 10 minutes of news per day, from CNN, MSNBC, or Fox News combined. Most Americans do not even watch an hour of cable news over the course of an entire month. Even the age bracket that consumes the most cable news, Americans aged 55 and older, watches roughly 90 minutes per day from all sources. Expanding to digital platforms doesn’t change the picture much: Only about a third of Americans read anything from Fox News platforms at all in a given month — and among those who do consume this content, users spend on average 38 minutes per month (just over one minute per day) engaging with it.
Incidentally, the demographic that is most likely (by far) to watch Fox News, Americans over 55, is also the age bloc where Trump support is strongest. In a world where Fox News consumption and Trump support were among the primary drivers of vaccine hesitancy, one might expect that vaccination rates would be especially low among older Americans — again, they are by far the most intense bloc of Trump supporters, and the primary audience of Fox News. Yet they also happen to be the most vaccinated group in America by far. The CDC estimates that nearly all seniors have received at least one dose of the vaccine, approaching 90% are fully vaccinated, and roughly two-thirds are boosted as well. In short, the older one gets, the more likely one becomes to watch Fox News, to support Trump, and also, to be vaccinated.
Despite glaring problems like these, a growing chorus has taken to blaming MAGA-aligned whites for continued COVID-19 transmission and COVID-19-related hospitalizations and deaths. As a matter of fact, vaccine-hesitant people tend to be much more heterogenous than many seem to realize – and people seem to miss the factors that actually unite populations prone to vaccine hesitancy.
Race, Geography, Vaccine Hesitancy
With respect to race and ethnicity, Black people have been more hesitant than most other racial and ethnic groups with respect to vaccines in general, and the COVID-19 vaccine in particular. They were less willing to take part in the vaccine clinical trials. They remained significantly more hesitant to pursue COVID-19 vaccines after they were approved. Although uptake has increased substantially among African Americans in recent months, their overall vaccination rates continue to trail those of whites.
Throughout most of the pandemic, Hispanic Americans also trailed significantly behind non-Hispanic whites with respect to vaccine uptake, although following a significant boom in vaccinations over the summer, they are now approaching parity.
Nonetheless, significant pockets of hesitancy remain among minority populations. Media companies love doing stories about MAGA whites who publicly flouted CDC guidance and then died of COVID-19, or who ended up with a bad case and recanted their views. It is apparently much less satisfying to talk about hesitancy within Orthodox Jewish or Somali communities, or among undocumented migrants, Indigenous Americans, or the many other racial, ethnic, and religious minority populations for whom COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is much more pronounced than among mainstream whites. Yet vaccine hesitancy within minority populations likely helps explain important trends in COVID-19 spread, hospitalizations, and deaths.
Blacks, Hispanics, and Indigenous Americans have been significantly less likely than whites to pursue vaccination, both with respect to COVID-19 and in general. Insofar as the vaccine reduces the likelihood of COVID-19 infections, protracted hesitancy within a given population would be expected to correlate with increased rates of infection and higher numbers of cumulative cases. And indeed, we do see this: the number of COVID-19 cases per 100,000 has been significantly higher among Black, Hispanic, and Indigenous Americans relative to whites. Asian Americans, who have the highest rates of vaccine uptake among all racial and ethnic groups measured, also have the lowest numbers of COVID-19 infections per capita.
Likewise, vaccinations have been shown to provide significant protection against the more serious manifestations of COVID-19. One would expect to see that populations that have had lower levels of vaccination over time would have higher levels of cumulative COVID-19-related hospitalizations and deaths. This, too, is evident in the CDC statistics.
Of course, vaccination rates are only a part of the story here: Black, Indigenous, and Hispanic Americans are also far more likely than whites to possess other comorbidities (such as heart disease, asthma, diabetes, or obesity) that are connected to severe manifestations of COVID-19 and particularly adverse outcomes, irrespective of vaccination status. These populations also tend to have less access to quality medical care in the event that they do get sick. However, more cautious vaccine uptake among many ethnic and racial minority populations likely helps explain a large amount of the observed variance in COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations, and deaths as well.
We can see this from another angle by breaking things down geographically. Overall, there is not a single state in the union where a majority of the adult population is not fully vaccinated. The state with the absolute lowest vaccination rate is Alabama, where 60% of adults have received two doses. Many other Southern states also have lower-than-average vaccination rates. As these states are also decisively “red,” it may be tempting to attribute these low vaccination rates to MAGA-aligned whites.
However, most Southern states also have particularly high concentrations of African Americans. Indeed, most black people in the U.S. continue to live in the South. And within these Southern states, Black vaccination rates generally trail behind those of whites, and Hispanic vaccination rates in the South tend to be lower still.
A telling set of maps by Reuters depicts the counties with the largest concentrations of African Americans, Hispanics, and COVID-19-related deaths — and how those counties trended in the 2020 election. Scrolling through the visualizations, it is clear that counties in the U.S. with the highest concentrations of COVID-19-related deaths also tended to have especially high levels of Hispanic and/or African Americans. Granted, many of the minority fatalities may have been among Blacks and Hispanics who voted Republican — they’ve been growing in number for much of the last decade, and many of the places with high levels of minorities and high levels of COVID-19 also shifted toward the GOP from 2016 to 2020. But it may also be the case that relatively low vaccination rates (and relatively high COVID-19 mortality rates) in “red” states are disproportionately driven by populations within those states who skew “blue.”
Either way, attempts to blame low vaccination rates in the South on MAGA-aligned whites seems to miss a lot of what’s going on in these states, including factors that unite unvaccinated whites and minorities, both in the South and beyond, and that probably matter much more than partisan affiliation per se.
Missing the Forest
One big problem with many popular explanations is that they focus on factors unique to the U.S., despite the fact that vaccine-hesitancy patterns observed in the U.S. are actually common around the world.
Across societies and cultures, people with relatively low levels of income and education; those who live in more rural communities; those who are racial, ethnic, or religious minorities; and young people have been far more hesitant to get the COVID-19 vaccine. In other words, populations that are underrepresented within the elite, and who often have strong and well-founded suspicion of authorities, are most likely to refuse the vaccine. The drivers seem to be structural, not a product of specific beliefs, ideologies, cultures, informational sources, or rhetoric by politicians in any particular country. The pattern holds across contexts, apparently independent of these factors.
Likewise, other major comparative studies have found that one of the most reliable predictors of COVID-19 transmission rates across countries is the level of trust citizens express in their government. This is because populations with low levels of trust in the authorities are less likely to follow protocols for containing the disease, such as masking indoors, quarantining (upon possible exposure to COVID-19 or when displaying symptoms of COVID-19), avoiding crowded gatherings in poorly ventilated spaces, or getting vaccinated. In contexts where trust in the authorities is low, there tends to be less social pressure to conform to expert advice either. Again, these patterns hold across geographical and cultural contexts, independent of the specific rhetoric, policies, or parties that prevail within a given country.
Across the board, then, we would expect to see, and we have seen, people with sociological proximity to elites aggressively and conspicuously adhering to elite guidance and attempting to coerce and cajole others into doing the same. Likewise, we would expect to see, and we have seen, people with high levels of sociological distance from those “calling the shots,” demonstrating much higher levels of skepticism of, and resistance to, declarations by authorities. And again, we don’t just see these patterns in America, but throughout the world.
Incidentally, those with high levels of perceived sociological distance from elites are also the people most likely to participate in conspiracy theories. As political scientists Joseph Uscinski and Joseph Parent put it, “Power asymmetries, both foreign and domestic, are the main drivers behind conspiracy theories; those at the bottom of power hierarchies have a strategic interest in blaming those at the top” for adverse social outcomes. That is, the kind of person who espouses conspiracy theories tends to be the kind of person who would be highly skeptical of, or resistant to, authorities and their advice independent of the conspiracy theory (they tend to be receptive to conspiracy narratives precisely as a result of preexisting mistrust), including with respect to vaccination.
The causal power attributed to conspiracy theories for explaining vaccine refusal, therefore, seems to be overstated. Marginalization and alienation from authorities seem to be the primary drivers of both vaccine hesitancy and conspiracy theories alike. In focusing on conspiracy theories, which are downstream from mistrust, people are missing what’s really going on. Indeed, as discussed at the outset, the kinds of concerns that the conspiracy theories gesture toward are widely shared among other vaccine-hesitant people who do not endorse the conspiracies. Put another way: Most skeptics do not seem to be concerned about vaccines because of conspiracy theories. Rather, many adopt conspiracy theories as a means of articulating their preexisting concerns about the vaccines, and forging community with others who share similar concerns. As I’ve elaborated at length elsewhere, sharing “fake news” likewise seems to be more about social signaling than sincere epistemic claims.
Nonetheless, many choose to focus on conspiracy theories and misinformation as the primary drivers of vaccine refusal in order to paint the vaccine hesitant as stupid, crazy, or brainwashed. Within liberal spaces, a growing chorus has taken to proclaiming that those who are unvaccinated straightforwardly deserve to die of COVID-19. Some go so far as to heap scorn and mockery at the deceased and their families. Public debates are underway about denying medical care to the unvaccinated and finding other ways to shame, antagonize, and punish people who are vaccine hesitant.
Liberals seem to feel comfortable engaging in the behaviors because they’ve bought into the popular narrative that vaccine refusers are a bunch of “privileged” MAGA-aligned whites. However, the ugliness of these sentiments, their eugenicist and elitist tinge, becomes much more evident when we understand who the vaccine hesitant actually are. In the U.S., as in virtually all other countries, the unvaccinated are overwhelmingly people who are marginalized, disadvantaged, dispossessed, and/or downwardly mobile from across racial and ethnic lines — including, and especially, those who also happen to be ethnic, racial, and/or religious minorities.
These patterns do not just persist across geographical contexts, but historical contexts as well. In the U.S., similar patterns of skepticism and resistance were evident in previous vaccination campaigns (such as in the struggles over the smallpox vaccine).
Parties and Shots
We are now well equipped to recontextualize some popular talking points about vaccine hesitancy and political affiliation.
Widely circulated reports note that counties with the highest concentrations of Democratic voters tend to have much lower rates of COVID-19 deaths than those with the highest concentrations of Trump voters. Yet media reporting on this gap systematically fails to observe the massive differences in wealth and healthcare access between heavily Republican and Democratic regions. Counties with huge concentrations of Democratic voters tend to be among the most affluent in the country, with huge concentrations of hospitals and doctors. Meanwhile, areas with the deepest concentrations of Trump voters tend to be among the most economically distressed in the nation, with huge swaths of the population also living in “healthcare deserts.”
Consequently, it would seem bizarre to assert that the most relevant difference between the most intensely Democratic and Republican districts with respect to COVID-19-related outcomes is partisan affiliation or ideological leanings. Yet that is precisely what reporters frequently do: pretend as though the main driver of the differences in vaccination rates, cases, and deaths is political beliefs, not the vast and systematic differences in wealth, education, or access to healthcare between these districts.
The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that 60% of those who remain unvaccinated are Republicans. Just taking this figure for granted, we are now in a position to see that political ideology or political partisanship per se probably explains very little of the disparities observed. Contemporary GOP voters are far more likely than Democrats to possess low levels of education and to live in communities that are rural, post-industrial, and in decline. They tend to have far less trust in government than Democratic peers (this is a big part of the reason they identify with the Republican Party in the first place). Moreover, growing shares of GOP voters are lower income, working class, and/or minorities (racial, ethnic, religious). These factors probably explain much more than partisanship itself.
Sure, the states with relatively low vaccination rates tend to skew “red.” But they also tend to be more rural, and poorer, with radically lower rates of postsecondary education and far lower levels of trust in government. That is, they are precisely the kinds of places, with heavy concentrations of precisely the kinds of people, who have proven to be vaccine resistant in countries around the world. In an alternate reality where Trump, Joe Rogan, and Fox News were not a part of the American cultural landscape, these same populations would likely remain far more vaccine hesitant than most other Americans — just as similar subpopulations are among the most vaccine hesitant in virtually every other country in the world.
Indeed, precisely because counties with huge concentrations of Trump voters also tend to have low rates of postsecondary education, we should be extremely skeptical of claims that ideological commitments or political partisanship are driving vaccine hesitancy: Those relatively low levels of education tend to be far less ideological, dogmatic, or politically partisan compared with social elites. Hence, the behavior of constituents in these districts is less likely to be driven by partisanship or ideological commitments compared with constituents in heavily “blue” districts.
Consequently, it would be fallacious to notice the statistical relationship between party affiliation and vaccine hesitancy and simply impute that the former drives the latter. Because of how things have shaken out in the contemporary U.S., party affiliation serves as a single proxy for a range of other factors that have been shown to drive vaccine hesitancy around the world (measuring sociological distance from elites). Hence we see a strong correlation between party ID and vaccine hesitancy. But of course, the first rule of statistics is that correlation does not prove, or even imply, causation. The primary cause of vaccine hesitancy seems to be perceived sociological distance from elites – a distance which gives rise to mistrust. Insofar as the authorities do not seem to share (or even respect) the values, interests, culture and lifestyles of the kinds of people who are vaccine hesitant – and especially if they’ve been burned by elites in the past – mistrust is not particularly mysterious. It is natural.
It also deserves to be noted that, again just taking the Kaiser Family Foundation estimates at face value, a huge share (4 in 10) of those who remain unvaccinated are not Republicans.
Many on the left are vaccine hesitant because they are also concerned about profit motives, perverse incentives, and possible collusion between government and big pharma. Others who are into things that are “natural” and ‘“organic”’ view vaccines, especially mRNA vaccines, as unnatural, artificial, and potentially harmful.
Healthcare workers also tend to skew overwhelmingly Democrat. Yet large numbers of healthcare workers are also vaccine hesitant, including in liberal bastions like New York City (and across much of the world). Vaccine hesitancy is especially pronounced among health care workers who happen to be racial and ethnic minorities.
Moreover, non-trivial numbers of Americans across party lines (nearly 1 out of every 10 unvaccinated Americans, according to U.S. Census Bureau estimates) declined the COVID-19 vaccine not because they failed to “trust the science,” but because they were actually advised by their doctor that they don’t need, or shouldn’t get, the shot. That is, not only are a number of healthcare workers vaccine-hesitant themselves, they are often responsible for encouraging vaccine refusal in others as well.
This is all to say that even many who are sociologically “closer” to decision makers have displayed reticence about the COVID-19 vaccines – indeed, they seem to share many of the same expressed concerns as those who are more “distant.”
All said, attributing vaccine hesitancy to MAGA-aligned whites, “fake news,” and conspiracy theories may be personally satisfying for many. It may facilitate one’s desire to villainize and dehumanize perceived political or ideological opponents. However, these narratives are not that helpful for really understanding who remains unvaccinated and why — let alone understanding what can be done to actually mitigate (rather than merely condemn) vaccine hesitancy.
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- Musa al-Gharbi is a Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow in Sociology at Columbia University. Readers can connect to his social media and other work via his website. Articles by this author
The Girl With The Naked Face
The weather has been cold in New England and I have hunkered in my heavy sweaters and hoodies inside and got exercise by skating up and down the halls and from kitchen to parlor. I have lots to eat and lots to do. We had a snow storm last Thursday with maybe six inches of snow that has been followed by days of freezing weather that solidified the snow into a hard crust wherever it is.
But I had a chance to get out and go to a food market as the sun was setting and the weather was a little above freezing and there was a slight drizzle. I did not have to check for a mask to wear in the store. I seem to have one in every pocket now. I have posted articles on that question the efficacy of masks in stopping the airborne virus. But, I just put it on and obey in the store. I have had, and probably will have, plenty of political and personal conflicts in the past when I thought I was standing up to people, or for other’s rights. But, I was not going to be the among the first to defy health mask mandates in public places. Not this time.
I put my mask on as I stepped into the store some kid was bringing a shopping cart back through the door. He looked about ten or eleven years old and I only saw him from the back. He said to the cart as he wheeled it into the area, “thank you for your service.”
I went through the aisles of products and people looking to see if anyone was bare faced.
I went to the salty snack aisle to see what was on sale.
There she was.
The girl with a naked face.
No mask.
She was pretty faced girl with light brown hair with curls. She was pushing a shopping cart as I passed with my hand basket with chocolates and whole wheat bread.
I admired her. I had hope for the future.
A woman’s beauty must be seen.
Flowers blossom with color because of environmental reinforcement.
If I was in bloom I would have taken my mask off too, but, not this time. I may blossom in a week or two as the weather warms up and I can shed some sweaters and fears of the COVID dictator’s lash. Now… is the winter of our discontent.
Sic transit tyrannus…
xenagoguevicene 